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The climate debate’s 
debating climate
Polarisation of the public debate on climate change
git t e Me yer & ank er brink lund
1. Intro
“Imagine if a scientist won the Nobel Prize in 25 years’ time, proving that 
CO2 does not affect the climate at all. Would that in any way imply that our 
efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption and our battle against pollution 
then had been a waste of time? Why can’t we just behave properly?” This 
was one of the final comments made by a member of the scientific panel at 
a public meeting in Copenhagen in spring 2008.
 The meeting was about anthropogenic climate change. The comment 
was a response to a question about the uncertainty of climate models, and 
it was expanded with calls to drink tap water instead of bottled water and 
to drink soft drinks out of recyclable bottles rather than from plastic cups. 
It was followed by applause from the hundred-strong audience in the hall. 
And it raises a number of big and difficult questions: Is the climate debate 
a scientific or a political debate? Or is it a moral debate? Why have scientific 
data and models been so central in the debate if they are not central to the 
substance of the issue? And what is actually the substance of the issue?
 In this chapter we will take a look at the public climate debate – and not 
least the discussion about the debate – as an example of a societal discus-
sion or discourse where science plays an important and very complex role. 
We will scrutinize a small selection of texts from the vast debate, texts that 
in different ways are suitable for illustrating problems in the debate. The 
purpose is to provide food for thought on how professionals – scientific 
researchers or administrators with a background in the natural sciences – 
can act appropriately in such debates and participate in them in a sensible 
way. There are no definite answers as to what it means to act appropriately 
or sensibly. And there are no recipes for how to do it. It requires ongoing 
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judgement depending on the situation. What we must do is think. This may 
be facilitated by the use of real-life examples, by drawing on insights from 
the history of ideas and by the formulation of thought-provoking questions. 
We will endeavour to do this in the following pages.
2. A fragile model
Amongst the members of the Danish public who attended the above meet-
ing in Copenhagen, there seemed to be general support for the view that 
the climate debate is actually not about science. Put bluntly, this view can 
be worded as follows: Science or not – doing the right thing can’t do any 
harm. And we know what the right thing is; we are well aware of our moral 
obligations vis-à-vis the environment, and we know that bad things will 
happen if we are not careful. We know that our patterns of production and 
consumption – of energy and generally speaking – must change, and that 
this goes for society in general as well as for us as individuals. So, accord-
ing to this view, the ‘issue’ is not a scientific question of whether human 
activities have caused the climate change seen so far and will cause similar 
climate change in future, and it is not a question of how and to which extent 
this can be documented scientifically. No, the ‘issue’ is a moral and politi-
cal one. It is about behaving ourselves. It is about the way in which we use 
resources, and how we as a society should organise ourselves with regard 
to our patterns of production and consumption.
 This view is not the only possible one. The public climate debate – and 
the debate about the debate – seems largely to have taken place and been 
judged on the assumption that the issue is scientific and should be discussed 
scientifically before becoming political. This has been the most widespread 
view, regardless of the stance that people have taken, and it is to some extent 
in line with the very popular model for the relationship between science 
and politics which dictates that first science establishes the truth about 
reality, and then it can be discussed and decided politically what should 
be done within the framework of these scientific facts. According to this 
model, science should confine itself to describing what ‘is’, while politics 
should confine itself to prescribing what ‘should’ be done. It may be that 
the political ‘should’ cannot be deduced directly and unequivocally from the 
scientific ‘is’, but ‘should’ must follow ‘is’, politics must follow science, the 
prescribing of action must obey the scientific description of reality.
 All along the way in the public climate debate, this model has been 
creaking and groaning. It has not been possible to maintain the radical 
separation of ‘is’ and ‘should’, of science and politics. Rather there have 
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been signs that it has become difficult to distinguish at all between science 
and politics. We will take as our starting point the view that it is valuable 
to maintain the ability to distinguish between science and politics and that 
society needs both.
Discussion, discourse, dialogue and reason Box 1
Debate, discussion, dialogue, discourse are all words used to describe conversa-
tions and the exchange of opinions: The words have come from Latin or Greek, 
and whether one word or the other is used in a particular context will depend, 
among other things, on the specialist field to which the text pertains. Some 
specialists tend to use the word ‘discourse’ all the time, whereas ‘dialogue’ 
dominates in other contexts – and in this chapter on the public climate debate, 
we have decided to talk about ‘discussion’ and ‘debate’. So is this of any sig-
nificance? Both yes and no.
All the words can be used to refer to conversations, and they are frequently 
used interchangeably. On closer study their etymologies and meanings are 
different, but these words – like words in general – are not unambiguous, but 
can be interpreted in various ways. This is most obvious in the word ‘dialogue’ 
or ‘dia-logue’. The last syllable comes from the Greek word for reason: logos – 
which can also mean both ‘word’ and ‘figure’. So ‘dialogue’ can be used to refer 
to reason as both ambiguous (word and speech) and unambiguous (figure).
3. Old story with a new career
It is a new phenomenon – at the most a couple of decades old – that the 
climate is discussed as something requiring political action. But it is nothing 
new that scientists occupy themselves with the impact of human activities 
on climatic conditions. Nor is it anything new that scientific attempts at 
predicting long-term climate change have been taken to the public sphere. 
In the polarised discussion that has been going on in recent decades of 
climate change as man-made or not, representatives of both camps have 
presented historical information to support their arguments. The different 
ways of making use of history for argumentative purposes may, in turn, 
serve the purpose of understanding what has changed.
 More than 100 years ago, in the 1890s, the Swedish physicist and chemist 
Svante Arrhenius, who was, by the way, awarded the Nobel Prize in chem-
istry in 1903, studied how CO2 emissions could contribute to increases in 
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temperature. In the 1930s, the British engineer G.S. Callendar, who was also 
into meteorology, collected temperature measurements from various parts 
of the world and concluded that increases in temperature were caused by 
emissions from industry of what we now term greenhouse gases. Similar 
conclusions were drawn by a small number of other scientists around 1950. 
However, these scientists were clearly working on their own, as traditional 
and specialised scientists keen to increase the knowledge about the natural 
world through their empirical testing of hypotheses about natural mecha-
nisms. Every now and then, conclusions from such research were presented 
to the public in the form of questions about natural phenomena which 
people could then ponder a bit. ‘Is the World Getting Warmer?’ was such 
Public, politics and freedom Box 2
Many misunderstandings arise because words such as ‘public’ and ‘politics’ are 
used without any thought being given to the fact that others may understand 
the words differently. For example, ‘public’ will make some people think about 
the state and the power of the state, and politics may be seen as synonymous 
with state control. This perception connects ‘public’ and ‘politics’ with a lack 
of freedom and coercion. Public affairs come to refer to situations in which the 
state must intervene. In this context, it may be demanded that the state’s poli-
cies be based on science, i.e. on precise, accurate and, in so far as is possible, 
unambiguous scientific knowledge about objects and their working mecha-
nisms. In connection with discussions about technology, such demands are 
often made – i.e. demands for ‘science-based policy’.
On the other hand, ‘public’ can also be associated with what is shared and com-
mon to all – society rather than just the state – and ‘politics’ can similarly be 
associated with conflicts between different perspectives, principles and interests. 
The second version is more in line with the classical views which associated the 
public and political life in the Greek city state with freedom. Here, public affairs 
come to refer to questions which should be debated in public.
Similarly, what is public and shared can be thought of as that which everybody 
agrees on and which is not open to discussion. Or, on the other hand, it may be 
thought of as relating to all which is uncertain and unpredictable and therefore 
calling for many different points of view and perspectives: discussion. These 
examples of interpretations are rarely found in their pure form in real life. They 
can to a certain extent be combined, but at the same time, they are very dif-
ferent, and they reflect a lack of agreement which has characterised the entire 
history of the Western civilisation. The difference is related to the difference 
mentioned in the box on ‘Discussion, discourse, dialogue and reason’, focusing 
on the question of whether reason should be associated with words and speech 
(ambiguous) or figures (unambiguous).
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a headline in the British Saturday Evening Post in 1950. ‘Are Men Changing 
the Earth’s Weather?’ asked the US Christian Science Monitor in 1957. In 1966 
and 1977 global temperature increases and human activities were seen as 
interrelated in reports from the United States National Academy of Sciences (see 
also Chapter 3).
 This information has been gathered by advocates of the view that hu-
mans are to a considerable extent to blame for the climate change which 
may lead to dramatic changes to the living conditions on the planet, and 
that mankind should therefore also act decisively to counter such change. 
Such information provides the greenhouse theory with a history and lends 
a certain venerableness to it; this is not some modern whim, but based on 
age-old insight.
 History is also used the other way around, i.e. in support of criticism of 
the greenhouse theory and related predictions as being untrustworthy and 
unsuitable as a basis of political action. This is done with reference to the 
changing waves of climate science as they have been reported by the US 
media in the course of the twentieth century. The point is that warnings of 
global warming have alternated with warnings about a new ice age. In 1895 
and in 1912, The New York Times carried articles warning that a new ice age 
might be on its way. In 1923, on the other hand, Chicago Tribune printed an 
article warning of global warming: ‘Scientist Says Arctic Ice Will Wipe Out 
Canada’. In the following decades, a number of articles were published on 
the impending global warming, but in 1974 The New York Times published 
an article headlined ‘Climate Changes Endanger World’s Food Output’, 
warning of a possible new ice age. The following year Time Magazine pub-
lished an article with a similar message. Scientists were quoted as saying 
that unpredictable climate patterns in recent years could be a sign of global 
climate change. It could take the form of a new ice age.
 So history has been used to emphasise that it has been known for a 
long time that emissions of CO2 could affect the climate and lead to global 
warming, and on the other hand to stress that scientists have never been 
able to agree on how the climate was developing and have changed from 
one extreme position to the other. And what is new then? The possibility 
of climate change can no longer be presented, depending on the tempera-
ment and the horizon of the individual speaker, simply as either curious 
and entertaining or as fateful and threatening. Rather, climate change has 
become an issue which requires deliberation and decisions. The old climate 
research has embarked on a new career as a societal issue. When reporting 
historical information like the above, one must be careful to make it clear 
which side the information comes from. This is because the information 
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has been gathered and published as ammunition in a conflict between two 
camps that disagree on how energy should be produced and consumed, 
how society should be organised, how we ought to act politically.
 The background to this strife – which has been particularly polarised 
and taken the form of a war between left and right in the USA – seems to 
be a fundamental agreement that the real question is a scientific one; once 
we know the truth, we will know what to do. Unfortunately, ‘the others’ are 
forging the truth. They are ‘politicising’ science. They are allowing science 
to be directed by politics whereas it ought to be the other way around.
 It is a widespread regret – which is not only voiced within the framework 
of the climate discussion – that science is becoming politicised. Underlying 
this regret seems to be an assumption that politics is dirty by definition. 
This is certainly not a helpful starting point for scientists wishing to make 
reasonable contributions to political discussions of topics belonging to 
their field of knowledge. A more fruitful starting point could be to regard 
modern environmental research as a field which has always been ethically 
and politically motivated, and which thus has not only been informed by a 
pure curiosity concerning natural mechanisms, but also to a large extent by 
a concern about how production and consumption affect the natural world.
 Environmental research has not been about pure description, but about 
description which was to move other people and prompt them to action. 
Moreover, it has been less about understanding specific individual mecha-
nisms in order to be able to imitate or control them than it has been about 
understanding large complex systems and interrelations. Thereby uncer-
tainty – a basic condition for human action which modern science to a 
large extent was developed to reduce – has become more visible as a basic 
condition that also applies within science.
 One groundbreaking book in the history of modern environmental re-
search was Silent Spring, written by the US biologist and geneticist Rachel 
Carson in 1962. When the book was reprinted in London in 1964, the text 
on the cover started as follows:
For as long as man has dwelt on this planet, spring has been the season 
of rebirth, and the singing of birds. Now, in some parts of America, and 
throughout the world, spring is strangely silent, for many of the birds are 
dead – incidental victims of our reckless attempt to control our environment 
by the use of chemicals that poison not only the insects against which they 
are directed but the birds in the air, the fish in the rivers, the earth which 
supplies our food, and, inevitably, (to what degree is still unknown), man 
himself. Rachel Carson became so concerned with this situation that she 
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spent over four years gathering data from all over the world on the effects 
of pesticides now in general use.
 (Carson, 1964)
Both up until and after the Second World War, the natural sciences have 
played a decisive role in the development of industrial production processes, 
including the development of chemicals for eradicating insects and killing 
weeds on farmland. Through modern environmental research the natural 
sciences also came to play a key role with regard to shedding light on the 
dark sides of such production processes. None of these efforts can be de-
scribed as amounting to pure, curiosity-driven research.
 From the outset, environmental research and environmental politics have 
thus been inextricably related. It is not an infection of which science can be 
freed. It is a condition for environmental research and for the environmental 
scientists’ contributions to the public debate that they address big, complex 
questions which are accompanied by many and considerable uncertainties, 
and that ethical and political aspects are always present.
 Since the 1960s, the environmental discussion has refused to die down. It 
has been an international discussion with regional and national variations. 
Especially in the USA, more than in Europe, it seems to have remained a 
sticking point dividing society into two warring factions, rather than hav-
ing become a unifying issue around which everybody could unite and see 
themselves as good people supporting a good cause. The climate discussion 
can be seen as a preliminary culmination of half a century of environmental 
debate. Unlike the 1970s’ warnings of forest deaths, warnings which proved 
too radical, and unlike the warnings of increasing human infertility as a 
result of the widespread use of chemicals, the greenhouse theory and the 
accompanying models and predictions have found support both among 
scientists within the field and among other citizens, and references being 
made to ‘the scientific consensus’ on man-made climate change are now 
common.
 The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), set up in 
1988, has undoubtedly played a major role in this development. The IPCC, 
which published its fourth report in two parts in 2007, has developed into 
a gigantic body with several thousand affiliated experts who are operating 
in a borderland between science and politics. This fourth report seems to 
a large extent to represent and/or to have brought about the turning point 
which has changed the climate debate from being a war between two op-
posing factions and into a unifying cause for everybody who would like to 
be a good force and to be perceived as such. Why? In July 2007, Mojib Latif, 
 
142 git te Meyer & anker brink lund 
a German professor of climate research, wondered about this development: 
“The results now being discussed are already almost twenty years old. The 
last UN report from 2001 said more or less the same thing,” he declared 
(NDR fernsehen, 2007). A Danish study is concluding that journalists are 
asking fewer critical questions about the topic than they did before the 
report. It also points out that this may have to do with the fact that the 
conclusions in the report are presented as more certain than is usually the 
case in scientific reports (Asbjørn & Bakalus, 2007).
 The widespread consensus that could be observed in summer 2008 
concerned the issue as a scientific question, the answer to which should 
be followed by political consequences. Now it is generally regarded as a 
fact – and is therefore discussed less than before as an open question – that 
human activities are making a considerable contribution to climate change. 
All sorts of products can be marketed as climate-friendly or criticised for 
not being so. All sorts of questions can be raised and proposals made with 
reference to their impact on the climate. Newspapers set up climate blogs. 
Universities appoint climate panels. Scientists join forces to submit ap-
plications for funding of climate-related research – and to write textbooks 
concerning the climate.
 However, there is no reason to believe that this means that the discus-
sion is over and that there is no need to learn from the process so far with 
a view to being able to improve in future. Actually, from another perspec-
tive it seems doubtful whether greater consensus has been achieved. From 
this perspective the issue is taken to be a political issue – with scientific 
elements – about how we should organise our societies with regard to pro-
duction and consumption. Admittedly, the cue ‘climate’ – like a cue such 
as ‘sustainability’ – can now attract people with widely differing views on 
continued economic growth and market mechanisms, and money can be 
made by emphasising climate care. However, the lack of consensus about 
growth and market mechanisms remains an undercurrent in the environ-
mental debate. And drawing the line between politics and science remains 
the big challenge.
4. Why everybody wants science to be on their side
It has been a characteristic of the discussion so far that everybody has wanted 
to appear scientific: They have science on their side, while their opponents 
are unscientific. This has given rise to quite a lot of linguistic dodging. Let 
us again take a look at examples from both camps.
 Among the most active advocates of the view that human activities are 
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having a substantial impact on the climate, it is not unusual to refer to 
studies which are concluding otherwise as ‘so-called scientific’ Likewise, 
scientists from the other camp are often not referred to as scientists but as 
extreme and peripheral persons, such as “a fringe group of dissenting fig-
ures”. Or they are described as “a tiny minority of the scientific community”. 
Or they are called “the Scientific Fringe” or “enemies of crucial research” 
or “contrarian scientists” – as opposed to “mainstream scientists”. Or they 
are simply referred to as “these dissenters”.
 The above examples have been taken from the USA and the UK where the 
debates have been most polarised and where polarisation trends are most 
clearly visible. These trends have been less pronounced and less obvious 
in other countries, for example in Denmark, although present beneath the 
surface.
 The choice of words is interesting. It is worth noticing that they are 
characterised by a different tenor to the one which dominates today’s dis-
cussions about democracy in English-speaking countries. In discussions 
on democracy it is normal to emphasise ‘local’ as something positive, as 
opposed to ‘central’, which is seen as something negative. In the climate 
discussion, on the other hand, ‘the fringe’ has negative connotations, as 
compared with ‘mainstream’, which has positive connotations.
 The expression ‘dissenter’ refers to religious strife and is used quite 
frequently. The term was originally used about Protestants and others who 
did not belong to the Roman-Catholic Church, and today ‘dissent’ means 
having or expressing views which are contrary to normal or official views or 
to official religious doctrine. A ‘Dissenter’– with a capital D – is a Protestant 
who does not accept the doctrine on which the Church of England is built, or 
a person who refuses to conform to the established church. The term ‘dis-
sident’ does not refer to religion in the same way, but first and foremost to 
politics – it is, however, difficult to use the term about one’s opponents as 
it has chiefly been used about critics of totalitarian regimes, especially in 
the former Eastern European bloc, and therefore has positive connotations.
 The religious undertones have been picked up and used as a starting point 
for critique. Thereby science moves to the other side: It is argued that the 
commitment to countering man-made climate change is not scientific, but 
religious. Again, the ‘so-called’ science rears its head, for example with a ref-
erence to ‘some of the doomsday scenarios currently being brought to mar-
ket’ and which others ‘seem to regard as scientific’. There is talk of “scientists 
sceptical of climate alarmism”, and warnings about serious consequences of 
the large-scale emissions of greenhouse gases are no longer associated with 
science, but with the “media and entertainment industries”, the “Hollywood 
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elites”, the “hysterical left” and to “the eco-doomsayers” as well as “grant 
seeking climate modelers”. The roles of “pop culture” and “computer mod-
els” are emphasized as a contrast to “leading scientists”. Modellers desper-
ate for funding are contrasted with “the many skeptical scientists” and “the 
serious scientists out there today debunking the latest scaremongering on 
climate change”, based on “scientifically unfounded fears”.
 There is a clear trend that both camps in the polarised debate want 
to have science on their side and see ‘the others’ as being caught up in 
politics and/or religion and/or the media distorting the issue. The groups 
with which one agrees ‘find’, while the others ‘fabricate’. ‘The others’ are 
in the pockets of special financial or political interests, while one’s own 
side is pure and above interests. Everything that can be seen as open to 
criticism is, so to speak, shifted away from science and blamed on religion 
or politics or the media. Again, what we see is an underlying agreement. 
It would appear that there is widespread consensus that the ‘issue’ should 
primarily be seen as a scientific one. There is agreement also on what can 
be regarded as reprehensible, i.e. views and attitudes and social interests. 
First and foremost there is also agreement on what must be seen as most 
trustworthy: science as the true description of reality, elevated above views, 
attitudes and social interests. The warring factions seem to agree that what 
is good and true must be found in or come from science, while what is bad 
and untrue originates outside science.
 The agreement has links to the model on the division of labour between 
science and politics which takes all questions about how things really ‘are’ 
to be scientific, while questions about what ‘should’ be done are related 
to politics only. In this model, science stands for the truth about reality. In 
practice, politics easily comes to be seen as the opposite, i.e. as untruth.
5. Conditions for politics
In the course of the history of the West, political and public life has been 
regarded as representing the quintessence of human freedom, but it has also 
been seen as a mere free-for-all. Democracy has been seen as an organisation 
of public decision-making allowing everybody to contribute to decision-
making processes about public affairs. On the other hand, democracy has 
also been seen as an organisation of societies, facilitating first and foremost 
that all citizens may represent and speak on behalf of themselves. Public 
debate has been seen as a fruitful struggle between many different views 
and interests. But disagreement has also been seen as threatening, perhaps 
even as a possible precursor of civil war. The model which says ‘science 
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first, then politics’ is not related to any particular understanding of politics. 
Rather, one could see the model – which is as old as modern science – as 
an attempt to avoid or bypass the fundamental conditions for politics and 
for human action in general: the existence of uncertainty, different social 
interests and disagreement.
 As natural scientific enquiry and approaches have spread to ever more, 
ever larger and ever more complex issues, these political conditions have 
become increasingly prominent also in discussions on science-related is-
sues. The climate discussion can be seen as an example of the difficulties 
of dealing with uncertainty, social interests and disagreement by means of 
frameworks of thought which have been designed with a view to circumvent-
ing these conditions in so far as possible.
Uncertainty and doubt as ammunition
‘Warming sceptics’ is one of many terms of abuse having been coined in 
the climate debate. Somewhat peculiarly, it has been used against critics 
of scientific climate theories and models. Why is this peculiar? Because 
scepticism is normally seen as a virtue in scientific contexts, not as a vice. 
How can it be that the connotations of scepticism suddenly change from 
positive to negative?
 Scepticism is an important concept in modern natural science; ‘organised 
scepticism’ has even been described as a part of the ethos of science – the 
set of norms of behaviour binding scientists together (Merton, 1968). Being 
sceptical means being inclined to doubting or to having reservations, for 
example about established assumptions. It can also mean being doubtful 
about the usefulness of trying to interfere actively with aspects of life. And 
being doubtful about the possibilities of achieving true knowledge. In Eng-
lish – impacting on today’s international discussions because of its status 
as a lingua franca – there is a religious meaning to the term. A sceptic can 
be a person who does not believe in religious doctrine, an unbeliever. ‘Scep-
tic’ is not a neutral term, but may be used to signify honour or dishonour 
depending on the circumstances. Because of the uncertainty unavoidably 
surrounding climate models, the climate discussion is rich in examples of 
both uses of the term.
 There is a clear connection between scepticism and doubt on the one 
hand, and uncertainty on the other. The sceptic is raising doubts about 
claims which are presented as certain. The sceptic will immediately ask 
whether something is, in fact, certain. This can give rise to renewed inves-
tigations and testing. A principle involving such processes of continuously 
raising doubts and conducting more tests is central to scientific observa-
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tion and description and constitutes, for example, the basis for the editing 
of scientific journals. The aim is to achieve the greatest possible degree of 
certainty – or the least possible degree of uncertainty – but there are no 
hard and fast rules as to when such a process driven by scepticism must 
and should stop. In principle, it can carry on indefinitely. That in itself is 
uncertain. One may decide, but cannot prove, when it is reasonable to stop 
doubting.
 Scepticism – doubts about what is certain – is used in natural science 
in an attempt to achieve the greatest possible degree of certainty. There is 
ambiguity here, a double relationship with scepticism. There is a confession 
to doubt which is voiced by scientists during the scientific process. But it is 
not uncommon for the signs to change, from plus to minus, when doubts 
are voiced by other citizens, including politicians, and when they concern 
the results – such as climate models – of scientific processes.
 Where scientific discussions and issues are confined to being considered 
in isolation in the scientific community, this ambiguity is not necessarily 
very evident. In such cases, scepticism and doubt can be encapsulated in the 
scientific world, i.e. can be reserved for internal use. Subsequently society 
at large can then be presented with the findings: the largest possible degree 
of certainty or the least possible degree of uncertainty – the appearance 
of certainty, for non-scientists to rely on. However, in connection with the 
climate discussion, this has not been the case. It has not been possible to 
confine the uncertainty to internal scientific exchanges. The scepticism has 
also entered the public domain. Thus, the uncertainty of the climate models 
has been a regular topic in the public debate.
 Those who are sceptical about the impact of human activities on climate 
change have, in this respect, had an easy time. For quite a long way they 
have been able to refer without ambiguity to the need for and the value of 
scepticism, using the uncertainty of the climate models as their ammuni-
tion. Uncertainty has, so to speak, been on their side.
 Nor has the uncertainty been difficult to deal with for the probably large 
group of people in between the camps, who do not contest that human 
activities contribute to climate change, but who do not see climate change 
as the most important of issues and who tend not to be convinced of the 
factual value of accurate predictions of future events. From this point of 
view, the uncertainty surrounding the models is only a problem in so far as 
it is not acknowledged.
 However, the most active of the proponents have had a difficult time. 
The uncertainty has not been on their side, and they have not been able to 
contain it.
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 On the one hand, scepticism has been presented as ‘our’ virtue: Accusa-
tions have been made against ‘the others’ to the effect that they demanded 
absolute certainty and therefore would not or could not accept the fact that 
science is always subject to uncertainty. The recognition that science is 
characterised by uncertainty – and by an ability among scientists to express 
themselves in a guarded and nuanced manner – has been described as a 
scientific virtue. This virtue has been seen as being in opposition to the 
demands made by ‘the others’. It has been argued that ‘the others’, and es-
pecially the politicians, do not understand that science involves uncertainty, 
and therefore demand absolute certainty about future climate change and 
about mankind’s contribution to such change before they are prepared to 
act.
 Scepticism has thus been presented as a mistake on the part of ‘the oth-
ers’: Those ‘others’ have been accused of being sceptics – of being incur-
able doubters who would not acknowledge that now something had been 
sufficiently substantiated and demonstrated: “Doubt is being produced and 
thereby an argument for politicians to abstain from action. This supports 
the oil companies in getting their way” (Fog, 2007). Debates have been 
framed to make room, at the same time, for criticising politicians and others 
for not being able to appreciate the uncertainty inherent in science and for 
contemptuous references to ‘the sceptics’. Scepticism has been described 
as a practice which historically has been good and sound in and for science, 
but which has been abused in the public climate discussion. Journalists in 
particular have been ticked off in a big way. They have been told that they 
should be extremely sceptical about the scepticism of scientists outside the 
mainstream precisely because the conclusions behind which the majority 
of scientists within a particular field end up rallying are the results of long-
standing, stringent, professional, critical and sceptical processes.
 Doubt and scepticism in the public with regard to climate change, its 
causes and likely future development has been described as a problem cre-
ated by the media. The ambiguity of science with regard to certainty has been 
pointed out: Science has been developed, it is said, among other things, 
to minimise uncertainty. At the same time there is uncertainty in science. 
However, the argument continues:
“The manufacture of doubt and uncertainty regarding the science of climate 
change was a deliberate, well-financed tactic by oil and coal companies and 
conservative politicians in an attempt to undermine public confidence in 
science and thereby defer action against global warming.”
 (Corbett & Durfee, 2004)
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It has also been said that although journalists have to critically investigate 
the interests of various sources, critical journalism should not become 
‘too critical as it can otherwise and unintentionally undermine the actual 
scientific message’ (Asbjørn & Bakalus, 2007).
 Regardless of whether one looks at the climate discussion as primarily 
a scientific discussion or primarily a political discussion, it is problematic 
when scepticism is used both to signify own virtues and the vices of others. 
This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a back-
ground in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate or to 
other major public debates about the environment and health: scepticism 
and doubt cannot be isolated (any longer) within the scientific community 
and cannot be kept from or admitted to the public discussion at will. The 
sceptical traditions of science spring from real uncertainty which will not 
go away. There are plenty of reasons why public debates involving science-
related questions are accompanied by scepticism. Therefore, openness about 
uncertainty is a prerequisite of trustworthiness, regardless of convictions 
about causes as good causes in need of immediate action.
Social interests always belong to the other camp
Independence of (special) interests is, like scepticism, part of the ethos of 
science, and the climate discussion has been strongly dominated by mutual 
accusations about not living up to this norm.
 As regards this topic, the most active advocates of the view that climate 
change is to a considerable extent caused by human activities have had the 
easiest time. From the outset, the oil industry has had an obvious financial 
interest in ensuring that serious restrictions were not imposed on the use 
of its products, and it has supported the critics. The latter have, on the 
other hand, been referred to as the Carbon Club and the foot soldiers of the 
producers of fossil fuels. There has been talk of “a small cadre of dissent-
ing scientists (of whom some are funded, in part, by industry)” and of “the 
industrial/sceptical contrarian view”, of “self-appointed climate experts, 
funded by the producers of fossil fuels” and of “sowers of uncertainty … 
such as the oil and coal industry” and of ‘direct or indirect support’ from 
‘the oil giant Exxonmobil’ and other representatives of the oil industry.
 Reference has first and foremost been made to close relations with major 
financial interests. To a lesser extent, reference has been made to more or 
less clearly defined political groupings. There has, for example, been talk 
of ‘status quo interests’, of ‘the climate sceptic in the White House’ and 
directly of supporting the former US President George W. Bush.
 The foundation for sending similar accusations in the opposite direction 
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has been less obvious. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases has only 
recently become a cause which could attract financial interests to any large 
extent. Instead, criticism has highlighted political connections, mentioning 
for instance “a global warming propaganda blog reportedly set up with the 
help of an environmental group”. Along this line, suggestions have been 
made about dubious connections to left-wing politicians and foundations 
and to partisan left-wing environmental groups, supposed to have a vested 
financial interest in hyping alarmism. It is no coincidence that these ex-
amples are taken from an American text (Inhofe, 2006). In a Danish context, 
for example, pointing out the opponents’ links with environmental organi-
sations would probably not have served to make anybody appear suspicious.
 Financial interests and political views cannot simply be put on the same 
footing. That would imply that politics could be reduced to no more than 
the safeguarding of financial interests. However, financial and political 
connections also have something in common. Both may signal a certain 
influence on people’s power of judgement.
 The criticism about a lack of independence has generally been presented 
so as to imply that this was a particular problem which affected only ‘the 
others’. Thus, those wielding the criticism appeared to be free from that 
sort of thing. They simply represented the clear voice of good sense and 
good morals: ‘We’ glide across the surface of the waters, ‘the others’ have 
chosen to move along in the mud – an assumption which is probably not 
the best starting point for any self-critical reflection on the part of ‘we’. This 
is where the challenge currently lies.
 Mistrust of special interests as something which can easily get in the 
way of the common good is part of the mental luggage in the West. This 
mistrust, accompanied by a wish to harness special interests, is also at the 
bottom of scientific norms and ideals about science as being completely 
independent and impersonal. In the past, the efforts have to a great extent 
been focused, firstly, on isolating science from special interests within the 
walls of protected research institutions and, secondly, on the development 
of methods to ensure that scientific results were uninfluenced by the persons 
who conducted the research. Such scientific methods are still being applied 
and developed further. However, at the same time, the Western world has 
embraced an official policy that scientists must maintain close ties with 
financial interests and government authorities, that as many patents as pos-
sible must be taken out, and that universities and other research institutions 
should conduct themselves more like private enterprises.
 Also, it is pointed out increasingly often that it is unrealistic to imagine 
science as being detached from social interests – including scientists’ own 
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interests in promoting themselves as part of the competition for research 
funding. This, in turn, may result in the overselling of science-based mes-
sages – about imminent disasters or cures. In short: it is obvious today 
that the scientific community as a whole is not above the sphere of social 
interests. The idea that floating in space is a possible working position for 
science is likely to hamper reflection and deliberation about how to maintain 
integrity while dealing with and containing connections with various social 
interests.
 Social interests have come to play an increasingly prominent role in 
science. At the same time, expert opinions are increasingly being sought 
as opinions from independent bodies which are completely detached from 
social interests. This is a dilemma of some urgency, regardless of whether 
an ‘issue’ is seen as being first and foremost of a scientific or of a political 
nature. This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a 
background in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate 
or to other major public debates about the environment and health: social 
interests (own interests and those of others) must be dealt with openly, 
critically and self-critically. There are no self-evident solutions or answers to 
this challenge, but the question can rarely be ignored. More often than not, 
science cannot be said to be free from affiliation with various social interests, 
but that does not imply that such affiliation should not be accounted for. 
Nor does it mean that it is unnecessary to document efforts to delimit the 
influences of those social interests on research questions and conclusions.
 The Great Global Warming Swindle by Martin Durkin (2007) 
shows that in 2007 it was still feasible to question in public 
whether global warming is attributable to human activities – 
even though the scientific evidence presented in the film came 
in for strong criticism.
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Disagreement as a threat to truth
In the climate debate, the most obvious clash between ideals about science 
and ideals about politics has taken the form of a demand that a political ideal 
about many-sidedness as a basis for the formation of opinion must give way 
to a scientific truth ideal. According to the political ideal, which is also a 
journalistic ideal, a public debate gains through contributions being made 
from as many perspectives and angles as possible. More voices encourage 
the well-founded formation of opinion. The scientific ideal is about uncov-
ering the truth, of which there are not several, but only one. This scientific 
ideal can be interpreted and specified in many different ways, and some of 
these go quite well with a political ideal about balance or many-sidedness, 
However, the climate debate has been marked by a veritable clash between 
the scientific and the political ideal.
 Proponents of the current mainstream have argued that many-sidedness 
or balance may hamper the recognition of truth, and that journalists and 
others are indeed hampering such recognition by presenting the viewpoints 
of non-mainstream scientists. “Balance as bias” is the English-spoken 
version of this critique, while a Danish (or Continental European) version 
focuses on ‘many-sidedness’ rather than ‘balance’. Many-sidedness and 
balance can be said to represent different ideals and understandings of 
politics. Many-sidedness is about many different viewpoints and assess-
ments. Balance, on the other hand, usually refers to just two parties, pro 
and con. There is a significant difference, but here we will concentrate on 
what the two statements have in common, i.e. the viewpoint that while 
‘balance’ or ‘many-sidedness’ may be good and necessary in discussions 
about political and social issues, other rules apply when it comes to sci-
entific questions.
 This argument – which is based on the view of the climate debate as 
first and foremost a scientific discussion – is probably the most widespread 
argument of all in the discussion about the climate debate. It is cited again 
and again, either directly as the central argument in the discussion, or clearly 
appearing as an unspoken assumption.
 In spring 2007, a BBC report concluded that the weight of evidence that 
climate change is predominantly caused by human activity no longer justifies 
equal space being given to the “opponents of the consensus”. Admittedly, 
the report also stated that it was not the BBC’s role to close down the debate 
and that the dissenters (or sceptics) would still be heard as long as their 
views were presented coherently and honestly. Nevertheless, the principle 
of ‘balance’ was toned down in favour of a principle of giving more space to 
mainstream science. Almost at the same time, the British Channel 4 – not 
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part of the BBC – broadcast the controversial documentary The Great Global 
Warming Swindle, which was also broadcast by the Danish public service 
DR2 channel in summer 2007, and which accuses climate researchers of 
seducing the global public and of having turned a scientific theory about 
natural mechanisms into a religion and ideology. This resulted in the same 
discussion flaring up, also in Denmark.
 The Danish DR2 channel broadcast the documentary as part of a theme 
on the sweating planet (‘Kloden sveder’) together with a number of other 
broadcasts about climate change. Afterwards on the DR blog, Jacob Mol-
lerup, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation’s Listeners and Viewers Editor, 
criticised the fact that the documentary had been presented as a ‘science 
programme’. Mollerup described the programme as very categorical in style 
and as representing the opponents’ views in a very caricatured form. He 
argued that ‘broadcasting it could be justified if it was part of a debate’, and 
that viewers would then probably be able to make up their own minds, but 
that it was problematic that DR2 should have ‘provided it with a quality-
stamp by broadcasting it as a science programme’ (Mollerup, 2007). Other 
bloggers disagreed that there could be any justification at all for broad-
casting the documentary. It was argued that: ‘It is certainly not the media 
which should decide what is scientifically true or false. Science should. 
If the media want to do a theme about the scientific statements made by 
science in certain areas, then they must try to do so based on scientific 
criteria. The media have no competence to decide what is scientifically 
true or false’. And: ‘Science is not democratic’ (Rasmussen, 2007). The 
idea that people could make up their own minds was also attacked: ‘After 
all, if Mr and Mrs Smith in their semi out in the suburbs could decide for 
themselves what is true and what is false, trustworthy and untrustworthy, 
then science would be superfluous!’ (Fog, 2007). Mollerup specified his 
views further: ‘The media should not play the role of superscientists. It is, 
of course, not for the media to decide what is good science. But the media 
must, for example, report on relevant debates about scientific results.’
 Debates such as this generate questions of use to considerations on 
what constitutes proper argumentation in the climate discussion – and in 
discussions on other issues which have been subjected to scientific enquiry:
 Should journalism and participants in the public debate simply passively 
report and receive the statements of scientists, or do we need scepticism 
and criticism from parties other than the specialists? Should others remain 
silent – or be silenced for that matter – when the scientists within a (more 
or less clearly defined) field have formed a clear consensus on a (more or 
less clearly defined) question? Are science and debate contrary in nature? If 
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so, how does this fit in with the widespread understanding of free and open 
discussion as one of the hallmarks of modern science? And what would be 
the consequences for political life in general if the argument that many-
sidedness or balance hampers the recognition of truth was applied within 
all the other areas where scientific answers are on offer? Should all debate 
about the actual state of affairs be closed down once the scientists within a 
particular field had reached a consensus? How often can questions which 
are subjected to scientific study be clearly defined as non-political and non-
social? And vice versa: How often can political and social questions be clearly 
defined as questions which cannot to some extent be studied scientifically?
 This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a back-
ground in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate or to 
other major public debates about the environment and health: room must be 
made for the existence of disagreement proper on science-related political 
issues so that a free and open, public discussion and opinion formation is 
encouraged.
 It is no easy task. It has even been quite diffusely defined in the above. 
We may, however, advance a step further in our understanding by taking a 
look at the notion of opinion formation and at frameworks of thought on 
the relationship between majorities and minorities.
6. The formation of opinion in politics and science
Both in the climate discussion and in the discussion about the discussion, 
reference is incessantly made to scientific consensus. This is not a very aptly 
chosen expression. Consensus signifies agreement. In the climate debate, 
it is used to refer to the views of a large majority. The view that journalists 
should toe the line of such consensus among scientists, no matter which side 
it supports, has long been widely held among, for example media research-
ers. Ten years ago only a minority of scientists argued that global warming 
was caused by human activities. It was therefore argued that the journalists 
should make sure that doubts were voiced and uncertainty highlighted (Mc-
Comas & Shanahan, 1999). Since then, the minority has become the major-
ity, and the expression of doubt in the public debate and in journalism has 
come to be described as a problem (Corbett & Durfee, 2004). References to 
the majority or mainstream have actually been imbued with such a positive 
ring in science communication that other words, such as “orthodoxy” must 
be introduced to express criticism of a majority view.
 The relationship between the many and the few, and concerns about the 
possible tyranny of the majority are age-old themes. Linked to the latter 
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concern is the view that might and right should not be confused, and that a 
system which automatically gives the right to the many may end up turning 
right into might – and might into right. Such concerns have had a signifi-
cant impact on the gradual shaping of today’s democratic societies. They 
have also informed a couple of centuries of debate about the controversial 
concept, the public opinion. Are they also relevant to the issue of opinion 
formation within the framework of the scientific community? Or is the 
formation of scientific opinion fundamentally different from the formation 
of public opinion?
 It is a widespread assumption that such a fundamental difference ex-
ists. References are made to “rational consensus” and “the accumulation 
of collective opinion in support of an accepted interpretation of the avail-
able evidence”. Consensus does not mean that there is absolute agreement 
or certainty, it is emphasised, but it is based on “a large body of evidence” 
and “many thousands of scientific papers”, almost none of which – in 
fact far less than a fraction of one per cent of the total – has diverged from 
the consensus (Ward, 2008). There is talk of “sufficient consensus over 
data and models” (Boykoff & Rajan, 2007). And it is stated that “scientific 
theories and interpretations survive or perish depending upon whether 
they’re published in highly competitive journals that practice strict quality 
control, whether the results upon which they’re based can be replicated by 
other scientists, and ultimately whether they win over scientific peers. When 
consensus builds, it is based on repeated testing and retesting of an idea” 
(Mooney, 2004).
 The underlying claim is that results of scientific methods and procedures 
should not be regarded as opinion, but as knowledge. What takes place is 
not the formation of opinion, but the production of knowledge. Does this 
hold? Is it that simple? Science does not necessarily fall apart if we allow the 
thought that the production of knowledge might take place concurrently 
with the formation of opinion, and that opinion and knowledge are not op-
posites, but different and overlapping phenomena. The above-mentioned 
references to “collective opinion”, “accepted interpretation”, “sufficient 
consensus” and “to win over scientific peers” indicate that it has not been 
possible to rid science completely of opinion formation. This does not have 
to be a problem, provided that the element of opinion is properly acknowl-
edged and that the process of opinion formation is regarded with respect. 
On the other hand, it can be seen as problematic when references to the 
majority opinion are often supplemented with references to prestige and 
status – the “leading”, the “largest”, the “prominent”, “top scientists” etc. 
This could be a sign that the formation of opinion is connected exclusively 
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to status concerns and not surrounded with respect as an intellectual 
endeavour.
 Opinions can be understood simply as more or less sophis-
ticated expressions of special interests  – as purely calculated. 
Opinions can also be understood in a straightforward way as rash 
and ill-considered results of gut feelings – as purely emotional. 
However, these are not the only possible ways of understanding 
opinions and the formation of opinion. Moreover, those under-
standings are likely to prepare the ground for contempt of public 
and political life as a seat of expressions and formation of opinion. 
Another option is to understand opinions – if founded on a solid 
process of opinion formation – as results of reflection based on 
observations, experience and the weighing-up of various principles 
and concerns. In this sense, opinions and the formation of opinion 
are indispensable in both science and politics as outcomes of the 
art of reasoning.
 Two points from the critique of the complicated concept of public 
opinion are relevant here. One point is: Those who have the means 
can – not least by means of emotional appeals – manipulate public 
opinion to promote their own interests. This is a point of criticism 
which can easily become self-fulfilling. Rather than trying to counter 
such manipulation, it can develop into a view that the public forma-
tion of opinion must necessarily be manipulation. Public and politi-
cal life then ends up representing no more than the safeguarding 
of vested interests and emotional appeal – as opposed to scientific 
facts, neutrality and thoroughness.
 In a much-cited statement from 1989, the American biologist 
and climate researcher Stephen Schneider, a veteran on the IPCC, 
expressed his frustration at finding himself in a dilemma where 
he had to choose between “being effective” or “being honest” 
( Schneider, 1996). He associated honesty with science and with the 
open expression of doubt and uncertainty. Effectiveness he associ-
ated with public life and politics. Scientists, like everybody else, 
wanted to make the world a better place, he argued. To that end, 
they needed broadly based support. To achieve this, they needed a 
strong presence in the media. And so they had to supply alarming 
forecasts and dramatic statements, and say as little as possible 
about doubt.
 This assumption about the necessary conduct in the public and 
political life – which is, precisely, an assumption and not a law of 
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nature – may have influenced many scientists participating in the public 
climate debate. Thereby, it may have contributed to dramatisation, polarisa-
tion and the toning-down of uncertainty.
 Another point of critique which has been raised against the concept of 
‘the public opinion’ concerns the fact that people are different and thus can-
not have just one opinion. There will always be people with other opinions. 
Even though they do not agree with ‘the public opinion’ – which in reality 
is not shared by all, but is the opinion of the many – they may be right, 
but they may not dare or have access to voicing their opinion. This point 
of critique is relevant not only to the public debate, but also to the internal 
debate in the scientific community itself.
 A German duo, consisting of the meteorologist Hans von Storch and the 
sociologist Nico Stehr, have made frequent contributions to the scientific 
and the public climate debate, and have raised the issue. They do not contest 
that human activities contribute to climate change, but they are concerned 
about the alarmism which, they believe, originates in the scientific commu-
nity itself. Alarmism aims to generate action by instilling fear, but this may 
prove counter-productive, they argue. Fear only creates a shift in the short 
term. The fear must be renewed and increased all the time. This produces 
an endless spiral of exaggerations and, in the end, may develop into a crisis 
for science. The constant alarmist hype eats into a scarce resource – the 
credibility of science (Storch & Stehr, 2005).
 Unfortunately, Storch and Stehr continue, the traditional scientific 
routines to secure quality and correct error do not seem to work. The 
public utterance of doubt by scientists is not welcomed by the scientific 
community, and may be referred to as the products of conservative think-
tanks, as disinformation from the oil and coal industry and as detrimental 
to the good cause. Researchers tend to keep quiet about doubt in public, 
pretending to have accumulated solid knowledge, which simply needs 
the finishing touches around the edges. According to Storch and Stehr, 
scientists practise a kind of self-censorship which may easily erode their 
ability to recognise new and surprising insights competing or breaking 
with the acknowledged patterns of thought. Thereby, there is a risk of 
science becoming sterile, the argumentation continues, but differences 
of scientific opinion are not embarrassing family affairs to be concealed 
from the public eye. In science, as in all other areas of life, development 
is driven by differences of opinion.
 In other words: Storch and Stehr clearly do not see science and disagree-
ment as being incompatible, and do not consider the formation of public 
and scientific opinion as being essentially different in kind. From this per-
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spective ‘the scientific consensus’ can be seen as ‘the public opinion’ in the 
scientific community. The advantage of that perspective is that it facilitates 
the practical utilisation, also in relation to science and to internal science 
communication, of centuries of thought about the complicated concept of 
‘the public opinion’.
7. Improving the climate of discussion
In the introduction, we cited a scientist who appealingly asked: Why can’t 
we just behave properly? The short answer is: Because we – the citizens 
of Denmark, of Europe and all over the world – do not agree on what 
proper behaviour should be taken to mean. The marked trend which could 
be observed in summer 2008 of people uniting around the good cause of 
fighting against man-made climate change – so marked that environmental 
organisations were concerned that other important environmental issues 
were ignored – should not lead anyone to believe that disagreement has 
evaporated. The basic, political disagreement about the use of resources 
and the mores and means of production and consumption is still in place.
 Like uncertainty and the presence of a variety of social interests, the 
existence of disagreement is a fundamental condition for political life. 
The acknowledgement of those conditions should not prevent, but rather 
encourage us to agree on guidelines on the proper conduct of discussions 
between different points of view. For example, people may hold different 
views on when and how it is reasonable to use science in a discussion – and 
at the same time agree that this is a topic for discussion in itself. The climate 
debate can be seen as an example of a discussion where this has rarely been 
debated. The dominant ideal has been based on the model providing science 
with the primary task of identifying the truth about reality while political life 
is presented with the secondary task of deliberating and deciding on action. 
The climate debate can also be taken to illustrate that this old model may 
somehow be flawed. In practice, it has not served to facilitate distinctions 
being made between science and politics. Rather, they have been allowed 
to become blurred.
 Every time the basic political disagreement about production and con-
sumption raises its head in a new shape, in the form of a new cause, science 
is called in. This may well happen too often. In the long term it may under-
mine the ability, firstly to acknowledge the limitations of science, secondly, 
to maintain the borders of science. If political aspects are not acknowledged 
as such, they cannot be dealt with. Thus, there is a need for the model to 
be revised so as to make room for acknowledging – and for attempting to 
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deal with – the fact that science also contains political elements: There are 
social interests and commitment, opinions and disagreement, uncertainty 
and more uncertainty.
 It is not possible to radically separate questions about how things are 
and what should be done. Awareness of the continual interplay between 
these questions is a challenge for everybody who – with a background in 
the natural sciences – contributes to the climate debate and to other public 
debates about the environment and health. It is important for the sake of 
the debating climate which – incontestably – is man-made and which it 
is, at least to some extent, possible to do something about.
 What it takes is acknowledgement of the facts:
 π that reasonable argumentation and the reasonable formation of opinion 
are not the preserves exclusively of science, but are also possible and 
necessary in public and political life;
 π that the difficulties with respect to acknowledging and dealing with 
uncertainty and with conflicts of interest are not confined to politics, 
but are also present in science;
 π that science and politics are indeed different, but they are not opposites 
and do not constitute a dichotomy – rather, politics and science condi-
tion each other’s existence;
 π and that room for criticism is of vital importance for both science and 
politics in any democratic society.
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